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No aspect of the burgeoning law of products liability has
generated more controversy than the so-called "second colli-
sion" doctrine. Under the second collision, or "crashworthi-
ness" doctrine, the manufacturer of a motor vehicle may be
liable for design defects which do not cause the initial accident
but which cause additional or more severe injuries when the
motor vehicle is involved in a crash or collision.
The doctrine, if not conceived by, was largely brought into
being by federal courts in the guise of applying state law to
resolve diversity jurisdiction cases. Erie v. Tompkins' requires
that a federal court in a diversity jurisdiction case apply the
law that would be applied in a court of the state where it sits.
Nevertheless, the "second collision" doctrine is primarily
the creation of the federal court purporting to apply state law
in diversity jurisdiction cases. Initially, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, supposedly applying Indiana law, rejected
the second collision doctrine.2 But the tide turned when the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals proclaimed the second colli-
sion doctrine to be the law in a case in which it was suppos-
edly applying the law of Michigan.3 Later, the Seventh
* The advice and assistance of Attorney Jay M. Smyser, Chicago, Illinois, is
gratefully acknowledged, but the contents are solely the responsibility of the author.
** Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.) (Kiley, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966). See Kircher, Second Thoughts on "Second Collision,"
19 FOR THE DEFENSE 64 (1978).
3. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the view of Indiana law
contained in its Evans decision and declared that, now, Indi-
ana would follow the Larsen decision.4
The second collision or crashworthiness doctrine imposes
liability on a manufacturer whose product does not cause the
initial accident, but where an alleged defect in the product en-
hances those injuries that otherwise would have occurred
from the accident. The older view was that involvement in a
collision was outside the intended use of the product; there-
fore, resulting injuries were not considered to be the responsi-
bility of the manufacturer.5
In the Larsen case, the driver of an automobile claimed
injury as a result of an alleged negligent design of the steering
assembly. The head-on collision of the automobile caused a
severe backward thrust of the steering wheel into the plain-
tiff's head. The plaintiff conceded that the design did not
cause the accident, but alleged that because of the design he
received injuries he would not have otherwise received or, in
the alternative, that his injuries would not have been as severe
without the alleged defective design. The general rule has
been stated as follows:
[T]he manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care under
the circumstances in the design of a product but is not an
insurer that his product is incapable of producing injury, and
this duty of design is met when the article is safe for its in-
tended use and when it will fairly meet any "emergency of
use" which is foreseeable. 6
The issue in the Larsen case dealt with whether or not a colli-
sion was within the "intended use" of the automobile. The
court held that the automobile manufacturer is under a duty
to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid sub-
jecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event
of a collision. The court of appeals in Larsen reversed a sum-
mary judgment in favor of General Motors and remanded the
case for trial. The original trial court had granted summary
judgment on the basis that there was no common law duty
owed by the manufacturer of a vehicle to protect the plaintiff
4. Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
5. See Evans, 359 F.2d at 825.
6. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 500. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398
(1965); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2D 83 (1961).
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from injury in the event of a head-on collision. On remand the
jury returned a verdict in favor of General Motors.
Although the allegations in the Larsen case were in terms
of negligence, other courts adapted the theory to strict liabil-
ity. Huff v. White Motors Corp.,' involved a truck-tractor
which jackknifed on the highway, sideswiped a guardrail, and
collided with an overpass support. Aside from the structural
damage to the tractor, the fuel tank ruptured and caught fire.
The flames engulfed the cab area occupied by Huff. Severe
burns received in the fire caused his death nine days later. His
widow subsequently brought a wrongful death action based on
the theory that the defective design of the fuel system caused
the fire that took Huff's life. The trial court granted summary
judgment, and this was reversed on appeal by the Seventh Cir-
cuit. The court stated, "One who is injured as a result of a
mechanical defect in a motor vehicle should be protected
under the doctrine of strict liability even though the defect
was not the cause of the collision which precipitated the in-
jury."8 Thus, the court adopted the Larsen rationale in a
strict liability case purportedly decided under Indiana law.
The court stressed that this did not make the manufacturer an
insurer of its products, but merely required that the manufac-
turer take precautions against an unreasonable risk of injury.
The court further stressed that the plaintiff would have to
prove that the defect created an unreasonable risk of harm
and that such defect was the proximate cause of the injury.
The Wisconsin court adopted the Larsen rule in Arbet v.
Gussarson.9 Arbet involved facts similar to Huff. The plain-
tiffs were burned when their vehicle's gasoline tank ruptured
after the vehicle was rear-ended by another driver. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court overruled the trial court's demurrer to
the complaint, holding that an automobile manufacturer
"may incur liability for injuries to occupants of a car arising
from the manufacturer's negligence in designing the car such
that it is unreasonably unsafe in an accident." 10 The Wiscon-
sin court adopted the rationale of the Larsen court and re-
7. 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
8. Id. at 109.
9. 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975).
10. Id. at 553, 225 N.W.2d at 433.
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jected several public policy arguments: (1) the possibility of a
large flood of litigation against automobile manufacturers;
(2) the difficulty that juries would have in properly evaluating
the complex economic engineering data that would be
presented; and (3) that the issue should be exclusively a legis-
lative rather than a judicial one.
Larsen, Huff, and Arbet merely held that an automobile
manufacturer owed a duty to the occupants of an automobile
to avoid causing "enhanced injuries" in a "second collision"
resulting from a defective design of the automobile. The cases
did not deal with the issues of burden of proof and the appor-
tionment of damages between the original wrongdoer and the
manufacturer. These issues were to be governed by the rules
applicable to "successive tortfeasors."
II. SUCCESSIVE TORTFEASORS
The liability allocation to a "successive tortfeasor" must
be understood in relation to the meaning of "joint tort" and
"joint tortfeasors." The terms have been surrounded by un-
certainty and confusion. The attempts to define them andto
propose tests for their existence have led to the conclusion
that the terms may mean different things to different courts.
The result often depends upon the different senses in which
the terms are used:
Thus, the identity of a cause of action against each of two or
more defendants; the existence of a common, or like, duty;
whether the same evidence will support an action against
each; the single, indivisible nature of the injury to the plain-
tiffs; identity of the facts at the time, place or result; whether
the injury is direct and immediate, rather than consequent-
ial; responsibility of the defendants for the same injuria, as
distinguished from the same damnumn.
The significance of a "joint tort" depends on the particular
legal issue or result that is involved. The issue may be
whether there is a "concert of action," or it may be a question
of joinder, or joint and several liability. The issue could also
involve judgment, satisfaction, release, or contribution and in-
demnity. The problems created by the "joint tort" or "joint




tortfeasors" doctrines existed prior to the emergence of the
modem doctrines of comparative negligence and comparative
contribution and continued after "joint tortfeasors" was ex-
panded to encompass those independent and separate acts
that combine to impact concurrently upon the accident vic-
tim. In Olson v. The Phoenix Manufacturing Co.,12 the Wis-
consin Supreme Court stated that when two or more
independent causes together produce an injury, each proceed-
ing from a responsible source, the respective authors are liable
severally and jointly.
As early as 1920 in Fisher v. Milwaukee Electric Railway &
Light Co.,13 the Wisconsin Supreme Court had expressed the
basic theory governing the liability allocation between "suc-
cessive tortfeasors." Fischer sued the street railway company
(referred to in the opinion as the Light Company) for injuries
sustained in a streetcar accident. The defendant appealed
from an order dismissing its third-party complaint against the
treating physician for malpractice which aggravated the plain-
tiff's injuries.
Under the facts that appear from the pleadings, it is plain
that the plaintiff may recover her entire damages from the
[Light Company], even though they may have been caused
in part by the negligent treatment given the plaintiff by the
defendant [doctor]. Selleck v. Janesville, 100 Wis. 157, 75
N.W. 975. It is contended on behalf of the defendant [doc-
tor] that the principles applicable to suits against joint
tortfeasors apply here. The argument in support of this con-
tention is unsound. It appears that the liability of the de-
fendant [doctor], if any there be, is due to his want of care
and skill as a surgeon, while the liability against the [Light
Company] is due, if any there be, to its failure to exercise
ordinary care. They are not in any sense of the term joint
tortfeasors. The liability of the defendant [doctor] to the
[Light Company] does not arise by reason of his liability for
contribution in the event of a recovery against the [Light
Company]. His liability is a liability over, and arises in favor
of the [Light Company] by reason of the fact that the [Light
Company] is compelled to pay damages which are primarily
due to the alleged negligence of the defendant [doctor], and
12. 103 Wis. 337, 79 N.W. 409 (1899).
13. 173 Wis. 57, 180 N.W. 269 (1920).
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for which the plaintiff might have maintained an action
against the defendant [doctor].14
The court then explained the nature of the liability of the doc-
tor and what loss was to be apportioned to him.
In this case, if the plaintiff prevails, the [Light Company]
will not have a cause of action over against the defendant
[doctor] for the full amount of the plaintiff's recovery against
it, for, under such circumstances, a part of the injuries are
admittedly due to the negligence of the [Light Company]. It
can at most have a right of action over against the defendant
[doctor], upon principles of subrogation for only a part of
the recovery. 15
The subsequent introduction of comparative negligence,
comparative contribution, and' the adoption of the "substan-
tial factor" test for causation, have not affected the basic doc-
trine that successive tortfeasors are liable only for the
enhanced damages that they cause. The original tortfeasor
can be held liable for all of the damages, including the en-
hanced damages caused by the second defendant. The source
of the Wisconsin court's insistence upon division of damages
in cases of sequential injury has been its understandable reluc-
tance to force the subsequent tortfeasor "to pay for damages
for injuries not shown to have been caused by his own wrong-
ful act or by the act of another under such circumstances as to
be attributable to him."16
Despite its 1920 recognition, the Wisconsin law of "suc-
cessive tortfeasors" has been surrounded with controversy.
The issue came to a head in the case of Johnson v. Heintz, 7
and after retrial in the second Johnson case.18 As a result of
the Johnson decisions, the Civil Jury Instructions Committee
of the Board of Circuit Judges was faced with the problem of
developing appropriate standard instructions and verdict
questions to he used in these cases. After much effort, the
Board of Circuit Judges synthesized over 60 years of legal de-
velopment into two sections: Section 1722 (Appendix A) and
14. Id. at 60, 180 N.W. at 270-71.
15. Id. at 62, 180 N.W. at 271.
16. Caygill v. Ipsen, 27 Wis. 2d 578, 589, 135 N.W.2d 284, 290 (1965) (quoting 100
A.L.R.2D 16, 32 (1965)).
17. 61 Wis. 2d 585, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973).
18. Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
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Section 1722A (Appendix B) of the Wisconsin Jury Instruc-
tions - Civil. Section 1722 is to be used when there are only
two parties, plaintiff and defendant. Section 1722A is to be
used when there are several tortfeasors. The two instructions
are the same in all other respects. Section 1722A reads in part
as follows:
Where a person has received injuries from separate acts
which are not related to each other, the total damages sus-
tained by the injured person must be divided among the sep-
arate acts which caused such damages.
You should not be concerned that you cannot divide the
damages exactly or with mathematical precision. In answer-
ing these questions, you should use your best judgment,
based on the evidence received during the trial, to apportion
the percentages of any damage sustained by (plaintiff) to the
separate accidents. 19
In drafting the instructions and preparing the comments,
the Board of Circuit Judges was aware of the difficult issues
created by the adoption of the Larsen rule in second collision
cases. The instructions and the comments deal with the issues
of burden of proof, the nature of the liability of the "succes-
sive tortfeasors," and the apportionment of damages among
them.2 °
19. Wis. JI-Civil 1722A (1984).
20. In earlier case law, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had suggested that non-
concurrent tortfeasors were jointly liable for all injuries to the victim where it
was impossible to divide the harm caused by each defendant. Heims v. Hanke, 5
Wis. 2d 465, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958); Bolick v. Gallagher, 268 Wis. 421, 67
N.W.2d 860 (1955). Those two cases stood for the general proposition that be-
cause allocating responsibility for indivisible injuries would place an impossible
burden on juries, contribution was appropriate for the actual injury, even though
the injury was the result of successive (not joint) tortious acts. This suggestion in
Helms and Bolick that joint liability could arise from the indivisibility of the
injuries was expressly rejected by the court in Butzow v. Wausau Memorial
Hosp., 51 Wis. 2d 281, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971). Justice Hallows, who authored
that opinion, stated that juries should have no more difficulty in allocating dam-
ages to the respective negligence of two tortfeasors than they do in allocating
contribution of negligence of two tortfeasors to the injury and damages.
In the first Johnson v. Heintz decision, the supreme court reaffirmed the hold-
ing in Butzow that inseparability of damages could not create joint liability of
successive tortfeasors. Johnson No. 1, in rejecting 1721, clearly stated that a
tortfeasor is only responsible for the percentage of the damages and injury as was
caused by his negligence, even though the injury itself is indivisible. The term
"joint liability," as employed in earlier cases, was used in the generic sense. It is
not a joint and several liability concept as in the typical two-car accident case
1985]
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The comments indicate that the following are established
legal principles in Wisconsin:
1. Nonconcurrent or "successive tortfeasors" are not
jointly liable for all the injuries to the victim merely because
of difficulty of apportionment;
2. Juries should have no more difficulty in allocating dam-
ages to the respective conduct of the original and the "suc-
cessive tortfeasor" than they do in allocating the percentage
of negligence to joint tortfeasors;
3. Inseparability of damages does not create joint liability
of the "successive tortfeasor" with the original tortfeasor;
4. A "successive tortfeasor" is only responsible for that
percentage of the damages and injury caused by his negli-
gence even though the injury itself is indivisible;
5. Juries should be required to apportion all damages re-
ceived in nonconcurrent tort cases.
Justice Hallows stated the Wisconsin rule on apportionment
of damages as follows:
We think the idea of the inseparability of damages is an im-
portation from other states and is foreign to our jurispru-
dence, at least since 1931 when our comparative negligence
statute was enacted. . . We see no more difficulty in allo-
cating damages to the respective negligence of two tort-
where two sources of negligence concur in time and combine to produce one
accident. There, of course, contribution will lie and the liability is joint and
several.
In the second Johnson v. Heintz decision, the court noted that in Johnson No.
1 it had stated that an "allocation of damages as to the impact was necessary."
Nevertheless, the court, in dicta, suggested that expert testimony could be used
to establish the indivisibility of the plaintiff's injuries and, consequently, the joint
liability of nonconcurrent tortfeasors. This suggestion was dicta because the jury
verdict after the retrial determined that all damages were occasioned by the first
impact and that the defendant Heintz was solely responsible for all damages in
the case.
After reviewing the case law on this issue, the Committee believes that the
jury should apportion all damages received in nonconcurrent torts. As such,
Wis JI-Civil 1721 and 1723 are withdrawn. Wis JI-Civil 1722 has been simpli-
fied so that it applies where only one tortfeasor is a party. Wis JI-Civil 1722A
has been added for use in cases where multiple tortfeasors are actually in the
lawsuit. This instruction requires the jury to apportion the plaintiff's damages
between the nonconcurrent tortfeasors. This conforms to the supreme court's
decision in the first Johnson decision and to Justice Hallows' statement in Butzow
that the concept of inseparability of damages "is an importation from other
states and is foreign to our jurisprudence, at least since 1931 when our compara-




feasors than we do in allocating the contribution of negli-
gence of two tort-feasors to the injury and damages. While
the problems are not identical, they are similar. It is quite
true in some cases the proof is difficult but the law does not
demand the impossible.21
From the foregoing, it is clear that in second collision cases
the damages are to be apportioned between those caused by
the driver and/or third party, and those caused by the defec-
tive design.22 The original wrongdoer can be liable for all the
injuries that result from the first impact and the defective de-
sign, but the manufacturer is to be held liable only for those
damages resulting from the defective design.
III. APPORTIONMENT
The apportionment of both fault and causation is a com-
monplace event in Wisconsin. Wisconsin law has been influ-
enced greatly by the general principle that damages should be
apportioned among the various causes and parties. Illustra-
tive examples are:
A. Passive Negligence Versus Causal Negligence
The passive negligence of a guest passenger is to be com-
pared to the active negligence of the host driver as well as the
active negligence of a third party if one is involved. The jury
must consider the conduct of the parties as a whole and in
doing so must consider the standard of care and the conduct
of all the parties.23
21. Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hosp., 51 Wis. 2d 281, 290-91, 187 N.W.2d 349,
354 (1971). The Wisconsin rule was recognized in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495, 503-04 (8th Cir. 1978).
The obstacles of apportionment are not insurmountable. It is done with regular-
ity in those jurisdictions applying comparative negligence statutes and other fac-
tual situations as condemnation cases, where in some jurisidictions the jury must
assess the value of the land before and after a taking and then assess a special
benefit accruing to the remaining property of the condemnee.
See Wis. STAT. § 32.09(3), (6) (1984) as to the jury's duty to assess the value of the land
before and after the taking.
22. "MIhe law of this state does not recognize any concept of 'joint but successive'
tort-feasors." Voight v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 80 Wis. 2d 376, 385, 259 N.W.2d
85, 89 (1977).
23. See Lovesee v. Allied Dev. Corp., 45 Wis. 2d 340, 173 N.W.2d 196 (1970);
Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Wis. 2d 91, 118 N.W.2d 140 (1962);
Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
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B. Causally Negligent Plaintiff Versus Causally Negligent
Defendant
In a situation where the plaintiff driver sues one or more
defendant drivers, the jury is to fix the percentage attributable
to each party in proportion to the fault that each contributed
to cause the accident.2 4 If a plaintiff is guilty of both causal
[active] and passive negligence, this total will be compared
with the causal negligence of the defendant in order to deter-
mine the liability and the amount of recovery by the
plaintiff.2 5
C. Derivative Actions - Husband and Wife
In White v. Lunder,2 6 the wife sued for her personal inju-
ries, and her husband sued for loss of consortium and medical
expenses. The jury apportioned 30% of the causal negligence
to the wife, 33% to the husband, and 37% to the defendant.
The trial court dismissed the husband's cause of action be-
cause the combined causal negligence of the husband and wife
was 63%, thereby exceeding the causal negligence of the de-
fendant. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed and devised
a method for apportioning the damages equitably. The result
was as follows: The husband's right to recover for medical
expenses and loss of consortium was reduced by the 30%
causal negligence allocable to his wife. The total recovery was
again reduced by the amount of causal negligence attributable
to the husband (33%) so that the total amount of recovery
was reduced by 63%, and the husband was allowed to recover
37% of the medical expenses and his loss of consortium.
D. Derivative Actions - Parent and Child
In Theama v. City of Kenosha,z7 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court recognized the right of a minor child to recover for loss
of care, society, companionship, protection, training, and gui-
dance due to an injury to a parent(s) caused by the negligent
acts of third parties. The court indicated that the child's
cause of action was subject to the defenses permitted against
24. See Wis. JI-Civil 1580 (1981).
25. See Walker, 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721.
26. 66 Wis. 2d 563, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975).
27. 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984).
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the injured parent, and, of course, the amount recoverable
would be reduced by any negligence attributable to the injured
child (although in Theama, no negligence existed).
E. Strict Liability - Products
In a products liability case based upon strict liability, there
is no finding of negligence, as such, on the part of the defend-
ant, although the Wisconsin version of strict liability amounts
to a determination that a defect is negligence per se. Yet, the
jury is asked to determine the percentage of responsibility for
causing the harm and attribute it to the plaintiff and to the
product in order to provide a basis for the allocation of the
damages. Thus, an apportionment is made not on the basis of
negligence but on the basis of the amount that each contrib-
uted to the harm.28
The same result is achieved when the jury is asked to allo-
cate the loss among the various defendants: the manufacturer,
the assembler, the dealer, and the seller. Although the ques-
tion is framed in the form of negligence, the finder of fact is
asked to determine the amount that each party contributed to
the harm.29
F. Seatbelt Negligence
In Foley v. City of West Allis,30 the court held that juries
could reasonably apportion the damages attributable to the
"seatbelt negligence" of the plaintiff between the first incident
(the actual collision) and the second incident (the collision
within the plaintiff's car). Clearly, this is an example of ap-
portionment based upon instantaneous and practically simul-
taneous events, not reasonably distinguishable from the
sequential injuries in "second collision" cases.
28. See Wis. JI-Civil 3290 (1975). See also Nelson v. Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 107, 102
N.W.2d 251 (1960).
29. See Wis. JI-Civil 3290 (1984). See also City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck
Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973).
30. 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983).
1985]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
G. Tortious and Non-Tortious Acts
In Johnson v. Ray,3 the plaintiff brought an action for as-
sault and battery against the police for excessive use of force
in making an arrest. The court held that the plaintiff should
have been limited in his recovery to the damages sustained by
application of such force, and that the trial court erred in not
submitting an instruction to the jury requiring them to deter-
mine which injuries were caused by excessive force. The court
stated, "The issue then was what injuries were caused by the
use of excessive force: (1) physical injury to the neck, back
and arm or (2) aggravation of a depressive condition or
(3) both. ' 32 Failure to instruct the jury as to what damages
should be apportioned to the excessive force versus the dam-
ages caused by the use of reasonable force resulted in revers-
ible error.
H. Comparative Contribution
The apportionment of harm between defendants has be-
come a routine matter in Wisconsin since Bielski v. Schulze.33
The amount of liability for contribution between tortfeasors
who sustain a common liability is determined in proportion to
the percentage of causal negligence attributable to each.
Thus, the jury is apportioning the right to contribution among
defendants based upon the amount that each contributed to
the harm.
Thus, Justice Hallows was correct in his conclusion in
Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hospital when he stated that the
concept of inseparability of damages is foreign to Wisconsin
jurisprudence since the enactment of Wisconsin's comparative
negligence law in 1931. It would appear that the apportion-
ment of damages among the parties in a second collision or
crashworthiness case is consistent with Wisconsin jurispru-
dence. Foley v. City of West Allis34 (seatbelt negligence) and
Johnson v. Ray35 (tortious and non-tortious acts) were a con-
31. 99 Wis. 2d 777, 299 N.W.2d 849 (1981).
32. Id. at 786, 299 N.W.2d at 854.
33. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
34. 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983).
35. 99 Wis. 2d 777, 299 N.W.2d 849 (1981).
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tinuation of the developing Wisconsin law of apportionment
of damages.
IV. THE SUMNIGHT DECISION
The case of Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.36
involved a "second collision" or "crashworthy case." The
terms are often used interchangeably although subtle differ-
ences exist. "The crashworthiness doctrine imposes liability
upon a manufacturer in a vehicular collision case for design
defects which do not cause the initial accident but which
cause additional or more severe injuries when the driver or
passengers subsequently impacts with the defective interior or
exterior of the vehicle."' 37 The Sumnicht case involved a vehi-
cle which was negligently driven into a tree. The accident
caused injuries to the driver, death to the front seat passenger,
and permanent injuries to the rear seat passenger. The jury
verdict ultimately resulted in a judgment against the defend-
ant, Toyota. The case reached the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin on certification from the court of appeals. The
certification provided:
Answering the issue presented in this case will fill an existing
void in Wisconsin law as to the standard of proof require-
ments in products liability/ vehicular crashworthiness cases.
These types of cases usually involve claims of serious injury
or death. Their impact upon both plaintiff and defendant is
substantial. Although the crashworthiness theory of recov-
ery may be said to still be in its infancy, these types of cases
are appearing with greater frequency. It would be helpful at
this relatively early point in the development of Wisconsin
law to have the instruction and ruling of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court as to the appropriate standard of proof upon
a plaintiff in a products liability/vehicular crashworthiness
case.
38
The decision affirmed the trial court's judgment and order.
However, the precedential value of the decision is questiona-
ble. Three justices addressed the issue of the burden of proof
of apportioning damages in "second collision" cases. Three
36. 121 Wis. 2d 338, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984).
37. Id. at 348-49, 360 N.W.2d at 6 (emphasis added).
38. Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., No. 83-812 (Wis. Ct. App., Dist.
2, Mar. 27, 1984).
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different justices, in a concurring opinion, concluded that the
jury finding was to the effect that there were no distinct harms
or damages to apportion. Since there were no enhanced inju-
ries as a result of the collision, the concurring opinion con-
cluded that the issue of the burden of proof on apportionment
of damages was not to be addressed. Chief Justice Heffernan,
writing for Justices Abrahamson and Bablitch, stated,
"[B]ecause the facts of this case do not present the issue of the
apportionment of damages, the majority opinion's discussion
of the Huddell standard of proof of enhanced injuries and of
Wisconsin law on the apportionment of damages constitutes
dicta unnecessary to the holding. '39
Justice Steinmetz dissented to the affirmation of the trial
court's opinion, stating: "This is a difficult legal case made
more difficult by the majority's opinion which I find to be con-
fusing and without precedential value, and in this respect, I
agree with the concurring opinion." 4
Thus, the Sumnicht decision results in four justices stating
that the law pertaining to apportionment of damages in sec-
ond collision or crashworthiness cases has not been decided,
albeit three justices attempted to do so. It is elementary that
before a case can be considered as authority for a principle of
law and precedent, there must be a concurrence of a majority
of the judges upon the principles or rules of law announced in
the case.41
A particularly effective statement of the rule is found in
State ex rel. Vesper-Buick Automobile Co. v. Daues:42
The opinion in the Barz case [Barz v. Fleischmann Yeast Co.,
308 Mo. 288, 271 S. W. 361 (1925)] is not authoritative or
controlling as a ruling or announcement of any rule or prin-
ciple of law by this court, inasmuch as the opinion in that
case did not have the concurrence of a majority of the judges
of this court, only three of the judges having concurred in
the opinion, an equal number of the judges having dissented
to the opinion, and one of the judges concurring only in the
result of the decision in the case. Thus, while there was a
decision reached by this court in the Barz Case, there was no
39. Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d at 380, 360 N.W.2d at 21.
40. Id. at 381, 360 N.W.2d at 21 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
41. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 195 (1965).
42. 323 Mo. 388, 19 S.W.2d 700 (1929).
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authoritative opinion, or announcement of the law of the
case, made by a majority of the members of this court.43
Wisconsin follows the rule that unless a majority agrees,
there can be no authoritative or controlling announcement of
a rule of law.44
Thus, the Sumnicht decision is not of precedential value
on the issues of proof and apportionment of damages. How-
ever, in view of the fact that three of the justices dealt with the
issues of apportionment and burden of proof in a "second col-
lision" case, it is imperative that the various opinions be ex-
amined and clarified so that the courts, counsel, and the
public will be able to deal fairly and effectively with "second
collision" situations.
A. Opinion I
The three justices (Ceci, Callow, and Day) joining in this
opinion adopted Larsen as the basis for their decision:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not sub-
ject the manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but
the manufacturer should be liable for that portion of the
damage or injury caused by the defective design over and
above the damage or injury that probably would have oc-
curred as a result of the impact or collision absent the defec-
tive design.41
Justice Ceci went on to state that a defendant's liability is to
be limited to that portion of the harm which he has in fact
caused, as distinguished from harm arising from other
sources. Recognizing that the plaintiff (Sumnicht) had a
cause of action against Toyota for all injuries in which the
alleged defective seat system was a substantial factor in caus-
ing, Justice Ceci clearly acknowledged that Toyota would not
be liable for any injuries sustained solely in the "first colli-
sion," since the allegedly defective seat system was not a legal
cause of the automobile's crashing into the tree. Thus, Justice
43. Id. at , 19 S.W.2d at 707.
44. See Estate of Todd, 16 Wis. 2d 635, 115 N.W.2d 551 (1962); Hagenah v. Mil-
waukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 300, 116 N.W. 843 (1908); Jacobs v. Queen
Inc. Co., 123 Wis. 608, 101 N.W. 1090 (1905); Walker v. Rogan, 1 Wis. 511 (1853).
45. Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 350, 360




Ceci recognized that Sumnicht had to distinguish between the
damages sustained in the first and the second collision as part
and parcel of his burden of proving causation.
[O]nly after Sumnicht has proven what injuries were caused
by Toyota is the issue of apportionment of damages properly
raised. The precise issue here is not which party bears the
burden of apportioning damages in cases involving joint
tortfeasors, but what quantum of evidence must a plaintiff
bring forth in a "second collision" products liability case to
prove that his injuries were proximately caused by the man-
ufacturer's defect.4 6
Justice Ceci then went on to discuss the opposing views
expressed in the federal cases of Huddell v. Levin,47 Fox v.
Ford Motor Co.,48 and Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, AG.49 Jus-
tice Ceci rejected the Huddell view as being contrary to Wis-
consin law but stated that he did not intend to change
Wisconsin law at this time.
In keeping with the law of this state, we hold that in a "sec-
ond collision" products liability case, the plaintiff must
prove that the defective product was a substantial factor in
causing the harm from which damages are claimed. The de-
gree to which the plaintiff will be required to distinguish be-
tween the injuries sustained in the "first collision" and those
sustained in the "second collision" will be governed by his
burden of proving causation via the substantial factor test.
This requirement is necessarily dependent upon the particu-
lar facts of the case. For instance, Toyota's defective seat
system did not cause the accident in this case, and, therefore,
Toyota is not liable for injuries caused solely from the "first
collision."5"
At this point in the decision Justice Ceci went on to misstate
the applicable law of Wisconsin in "second collision" fact situ-
ations. The opinion states that if the plaintiff proves that the
defect was a cause of Sumnicht's injuries, he need not prove
what portion of indivisible harm is attributable solely to the
manufacturer. The parties become joint tortfeasors, and their
liability is joint and several.
46. Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d at 353-54, 360 N.W.2d at 9.
47. 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
48. 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
49. 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982).
50. Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d at 358-59, 360 N.W.2d at 11.
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In successive tort situations, the law in Wisconsin is clear
that the initial tortfeasor is liable for all of the injuries that
flow therefrom as a direct chain from the initial accident.
Therefore, the driver of the vehicle in Sumnicht would be lia-
ble for all injuries incurred by his passengers as well as any
property damage that may have resulted. The successive
tortfeasor (Toyota) is liable only for those damages that would
have been caused "over and above the damage or injury that
probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or
collision absent the defective design." 51 As to the "enhanced
injuries," the initial tortfeasor and the manufacturer are
jointly and severally liable. However, the manufacturer is not
responsible for the initial injuries. Therefore, the status of the
parties differs depending on what injuries are involved. It is at
this point that the first opinion becomes confusing and creates
the impression that in all "second collision" cases, once it is
proven that the manufacturer's defective design was a sub-
stantial factor in producing the enhanced injuries, he would be
responsible for all loss on the basis of joint and several
liability.
In any event, once the plaintiff has proven that the defect
was a cause of his injuries, he need not prove what portion of
indivisible harm is attributable solely to the manufacturer.
If there is more than one tortfeasor who contributed to the
injury, Wisconsin's law concerning joint and several liability
applies.5 2
Justice Ceci cites Butzow and the first Johnson decision as au-
thority. Neither case supports this rule. Both cases held that
the successive tortfeasor was liable only for the aggravated
damages. The court concluded its discussion of the rule in
"second collision" cases as follows: "As discussed above, only
after the plaintiff establishes that there are joint tortfeasors
can the issue of apportionment of damages be raised. '53 If
this statement is limited to the holding that they are jointly
and severally liable for the enhanced injuries, then it is a cor-
rect statement of the law. On the other hand, if the language
is interpreted to mean that the manufacturer and the driver
are joint tortfeasors and liable jointly and severally for all inju-
51. Id. at 350, 360 N.W.2d at 7 (quoting Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503).
52. Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d at 359, 360 N.W.2d at 11.
53. Id. at 360, 360 N.W.2d at 12.
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ries suffered by Sumnicht, then the law is stated incorrectly.
If the decision means that under the facts of the case the inju-
ries to the rear seat passenger (Sumnicht) were not caused by
the initial collision, but were caused when the first impact
combined with the second impact, then the parties are joint
tortfeasors. Perhaps this is what the court meant when it
stated, "we recognize that a plaintiff will not have to distin-
guish between injuries in every case because not all 'second
collision' cases involve multiple injuries capable of division."54
On the other hand, if this language is intended to mean that
the damages are not to be apportioned when enhanced injuries
are involved, then the law is misstated.
B. Opinion II (Concurring)
The foregoing analysis is buttressed by the view of the
three justices (Heffernan, Abrahamson, and Bablitch) joining
in the concurring opinion wherein they approved the outcome
of the case in the trial court on the theory that the initial im-
pact would not have caused injuries to the rear seat passenger,
and that the defective seat system did not enhance the injuries
but actually caused all of the injuries. Under this view of the
facts, the justices are saying that the parties were joint
tortfeasors and that there were no distinct harms or damages
to apportion. "This court, therefore, need not address the is-
sue of the burden of proof of apportioning damages in 'second
collision' cases." 55
Thus, the concurring justices rejected the first opinion's
discussion of the federal court's standard of proof of enhanced
injuries and its statement of what the law is as to the appor-
tionment of "second collision" damages in Wisconsin.
C Opinion III (Dissenting)
The dissenting opinion, by Justice Steinmetz, agreed with
the concurring opinion that the first opinion had no preceden-
tial value. The effect, therefore, is that four justices of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court state that the first opinion's lan-
guage relative to the proof necessary to impose liability on a
54. Id. at 359, 360 N.W.2d at 11.
55. Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 380, 360
N.W.2d 2, 21 (1984) (Heffernan, J., concurring).
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manufacturer for "second collision" injuries, is not the law in
Wisconsin. The dissent pointed out that the first opinion
adopted the "second impact - enhanced injury doctrine in
that the defendant is only liable for damages (injuries) sus-
tained in the second impact and the plaintiff must separate in
his proof the injuries sustained in the first and second
impact. 56
V. THE MASKREY DECISION
The case of Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk, AG was being
tried to verdict and judgment in the Circuit Court of Milwau-
kee County while the Sumnicht case was awaiting decision.
Subsequent to the Sumnicht decision, the Maskrey case was
appealed to the court of appeals and a decision was rendered
in Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk, AG. 7 The Maskrey decision
involved a two-vehicle collision wherein the plaintiff, Mas-
krey, was seriously injured. The jury found that the defendant
driver (Szuta) was causally negligent and that Volkswagen
was causally negligent as to design and testing of the
campmobile and also that the campmobile was defective as to
design and testing which was causal to Maskrey's enhanced
injuries. Maskrey was also found negligent for failing to wear
a seat belt. The jury found that 57% of Maskrey's damages
were "enhanced injuries," that 28% of the injuries would have
occurred without any defect in the campmobile, and that 15%
of Maskrey's injuries were caused by his failure to wear a seat
belt.
The Maskrey court confirmed that Volkswagen was a suc-
cessive tortfeasor and that Volkswagen should be liable for
only that portion of the injuries and damages over and above
the damage that would have occurred as a result of the impact
or collision absent the defective design. Relying on the second
Johnson case the court stated:
[T]he plaintiff has the burden of proof to show injury and
damages caused by the negligence of the tortfeasors, but that
it is the defendants' burden to allocate the damages from two
or more impacts, and that separate verdict questions for the
56. Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 383, 360
N.W.2d 2, 23 (1984) (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
57. 125 Wis. 2d 145, 370 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1985).
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comparative negligence damages are mandated in this
circumstance. 8
The Board of Circuit Judges in analyzing the second John-
son decision, and in commenting on it relative to the alloca-
tion of damages, stated that the court's suggestions were dicta
because the jury verdict after the retrial determined that all
damages were occasioned by the first impact and that the de-
fendant, Heintz, was solely responsible for all damages in the
case. It is a sad commentary on the development of Wiscon-
sin law when dicta, by force of repetition, becomes the rule.
Relative to the Sumnicht decision, the Maskrey court stated as
follows:
[Sumnicht] decided the proper method for trial courts to ap-
ply in products liability cases where the claimant alleges that
he suffered enhanced injuries because a vehicle was not
crashworthy. In Sumnicht, the enhanced injuries and the in-
juries resulting from the crash itself were found to be indivis-
ible. Two caveats must be noted before we proceed: (1) we
acknowledge that the resultant injuries and damages in
Sumnicht were indivisible; and (2) the concurring opinion
criticizes the majority opinion for unnecessary and extensive
dicta. We note, however, that the concurring opinion does
not criticize the reasoning of the dicta, only its necessity.5 9
Perhaps the injuries in Sumnicht were indivisible, but the
basis of the decision was not indivisible injuries but causal
harm. The approval of the trial court decision by both the
first opinion and the second opinion (concurring) was to the
effect that the evidence supported a finding that the defective
design was the cause of all of the injuries suffered by
Sumnicht.
The statement in Maskrey that the concurring opinion
merely criticized the majority is inaccurate in that the first
opinion is not a majority opinion but, in fact, a minority one.
Further, the concurring opinion's criticism relative to the first
opinion, was not only that it was unnecessary dicta, but that
there were no distinct harms or damages to apportion, and,
therefore, the court had no occasion to address the issue of
burden of proof in apportioning damages in second collision
cases. Thus, the facts did not present the issue of apportion-
58. Id. at 153-54, 370 N.W.2d at 819-20.
59. Id. at 154-55, 370 N.W.2d at 820.
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ment. The dissenting opinion found the first opinion to be
without precedential value. The effect of the Maskrey decision
is to take a three judge opinion, which has no precedential
value and is unnecessary dicta, and make it the law. The re-
sult of the Sumnicht appeal was merely to affirm the judgment
of the trial court and not to establish any binding legal
precedent.
Maskrey states that in a second collision or crashworthi-
ness case, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that the defec-
tive product was a substantial factor in causing the harm for
which the plaintiff is claiming damages. Once the trial court
determines that the plaintiff has met the burden of proof, then
the burden to apportion the damages is placed upon the man-
ufacturer of the defective product. This bootstrap result is
based upon the dicta in the second Johnson case and the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Section 433B and shifts to
the manufacturer the burden of proving a negative - what
damages were not caused by the defective product. Wisconsin
has never required the plaintiff to prove a negative; thus, in
justice and fairness, a defendant should not be required to do
SO.
VI. SUMMARY
The law of liability allocation between successive
tortfeasors was first promulgated in Fischer v. Milwaukee
Electric Railway & Light Co.6° The rule is summarized in sec-
ond collision cases as follows:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not sub-
ject the manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but
the manufacturer should be liable for that portion of the
damage or injury caused by the defective design over and
above the damage or injury that probably would have oc-
curred as a result of the impact or collision absent the defec-
tive design.61
The Wisconsin court has adopted the foregoing rule and has
stated the policy basis for the rule as follows: "[T]he basic
premise behind all tort law [is that] which limits a defendant's
60. 173 Wis. 57, 180 N.W. 269 (1920).




liability to that portion of harm which he has in fact caused,
as distinguished from harm arising from other sources. "62
The scope of a manufacturer's liability in a "second coll-
sion" case was first decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in Arbet v. Gussarson.63 The Arbet court relied on Schnabl v.
Ford Motor Co. 64 and quoted from Schnabl as follows:
"[A]ppellant is not suing for total injuries but for the death
alleged to have been caused by the incremental injury which
occurred because of the faulty seat belt."' 65 Thus, the second
collision doctrine involves the issue of the successive
tortfeasor's extent of liability. The second collision doctrine
extends the manufacturer's liability to include design defects
that do not cause accidents but may increase the severity of
the injuries that would have occurred absent the defective de-
sign. "Under the second collision doctrine, the manufacturer
theoretically is not liable for the entire damage incurred in the
collision. Rather, the manufacturer is liable only for that por-
tion of a claimant's injuries representing the amount by which
the alleged defect 'aggravated' or 'enhanced' the injuries. 66
Enhanced injuries are injuries aggravated by reason of an al-
leged defect over and above those that otherwise would have
been sustained in a collision.67 Thus, the principle of the sec-
ond collision or crashworthiness cases is based on the concept
that the manufacturer of a design defect can be held liable for
the "enhanced" or "aggravated" injuries. However, the diffi-
culty in determining the extent to which the alleged manufac-
turing defect contributed to the injuries has caused some
courts to blur the distinction between sucessive tortfeasors
and joint tortfeasors. The problems of proof are more difficult
in the second collision or crashworthiness situations because
of the time sequence that is involved, which is usually much
shorter than the traditional successive tortfeasor situation.
62. Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 350, 360
N.W.2d 2, 7 (1984).
63. 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975).
64. 54 Wis. 2d 345, 195 N.W.2d 602 (1972).
65. Arbet, 66 Wis. 2d at 557-58, 225 N.W.2d at 435.
66. Note, Second Collision Liability: A Critique of Two approaches to Plaintiffls
Burden of Proof 68 IOWA L. REv. 811, 812 (1983).
67. See Foland, Enhanced Injury: Problems of Proof in "Second Collision" and
"Crashworthy" Cases, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 608 (1977).
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In a head-on collision between an automobile traveling at
moderate speed and a stationary object, the first collision
lasts less than one tenth of a second. Immediately after the
initial impact, the driver and passengers move forward until
they [are restrained or] strike some part of the car's interior.
This second collision also lasts less than one tenth of a
second.68
During the trial, the role that the aspects of the design or indi-
vidual components of the automobile play in the occupant's
fate, during those fleeting moments, is "recreated" by an ex-
pert. The expert's calculations as to the trajectory of the oc-
cupants' bodies, as well as other events, depend upon
assumptions as to the original positions of the bodies in addi-
tion to a variety of other uncertain variables.69
In a "second collision" situation there must be proof of a
causal connection between the alleged defect and the injury.
In addition, the proof of such a causal connection is an ele-
ment of the plaintiff's case; therefore, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving it. As a result, alternate approaches to de-
fining the standards of proof under the second collision doc-
trine have developed.7 °
It is apparent that the issue of what must be proven and
which party has the burden of proof in "second collision" in-
juries involves public policy considerations. Justice Heffernan
stated the policy issue in Caygill v. Ipsen,71 as follows:
[A] question of social and judicial policy arises. Stated from
a plaintiff's viewpoint, the problem is said to be whether the
injured plaintiff shall recover nothing because he is unable to
carry the impossible burden of proving the respective shares
of harm caused by each tortfeasor, or whether a tortfeasor
may be required to pay more than his theoretical share of the
68. Note, Apportionment of Damages in the "Second Collision" Case, 63 VA. L.
REV. 475, 476 n.9 (1977).
69. See O'Donnell, The Burden of Proof In Second Collision Litigation, 1983
S.M.U. PRODUCTS LIABILrrY INST. § 6.01 (1983).
70. See Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1982); Fox v.
Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978); Huddell v. Lefvin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d
Cir. 1976); See Note, supra note 66; Foland, supra note 67; Hoenign, Resolution of
"Crashworthiness" Design Claims, 55 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 633 (1981); Lambert, A Sec-
ondary Impact Product - Caused Injury - Hostile Exterior Design and the "Un-
crashworthy" Product, 1983 S.M.U. PRODUCT LIABiLrrY INST. § 7.01-.04 (1983).
71. 27 Wis. 2d 578, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965).
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damages accruing out of a confused situation which his
wrong has helped to create.
Stated from a defendant's viewpoint, the question is
whether the defendant will be forced to pay damages for in-
juries not shown to have been caused by his own wrongful
act or by the act of another under such circumstances as to
be attributable to him.72
The Board of Circuit Judges73 recognized the difficulties
and policy issues in second collision cases. They resolved the
issues by requiring the jury to divide the damages even though
such a division may be difficult because of the nature of the
plaintiff's injuries. In other words, the division of damages
becomes a question of fact in every second collision injury,
and the damages are to be divided by the trier of fact upon
proof that the alleged defective design was a substantial factor
in causing some harm to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff must prove that the defendant's negligence
was a substantial factor in contributing to the result. This rule
was stated as follows in Schnabl:74 "Whether the delivery in
Wisconsin of a faulty seat belt could have been a substantial
factor in causing the death of deceased, even if it played no
part in the accident, is a question of fact to be determined by
the trier of fact." 75
The plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant's al-
leged defective design of the automobile was a "substantial
factor" in causing some of the plaintiff's injuries. The burden
of proof does not shift. If the plaintiff can prove the injuries
that were "enhanced" by the defective design, then the de-
fendant is to be held liable for the amount of the enhanced
injuries. If the plaintiff cannot prove the actual amount of en-
hancement but does prove that the defendant's conduct was a
"substantial factor" in causing some of the plaintiff's injuries,
then the trier of fact is required to apportion the damages as
equitably as it can between the respective parties. This equita-
ble apportionment could involve the author of the first colli-
sion, the manufacturer of the automobile, and the injured
party's own conduct. In this way each party would be re-
72. Id. at 589, 135 N.W.2d at 290 (quoting Annot., 100 A.L.R. 2D 16, 31 (1965)).
73. Wis. JI-Civil 1722A (1984).
74. 54 Wis. 2d 345, 195 N.W.2d 602 (1972).
75. Id. at 354, 195 N.W.2d at 607.
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quired to introduce as much evidence as was available to assist
the jury in arriving at its apportionment.
If the courts would follow this procedure, then any ap-
pearance of conflicting rules of law would disappear, and Wis-
consin would be able to continue its traditional course of
allowing the trier of fact to apportion the various parties' con-
tributions to the injuries. Thus, Wisconsin could offer a sim-
ple solution to the confusion created by the federal courts. In
view of the fact that forty-two states have now adopted some
form of comparative negligence, the same result could be
achieved uniformly throughout these states to the benefit of
injured parties, the manufacturers of products, and the gen-
eral public.
Much of the difficulty in the second collision or
crashworthiness cases stems from the fact that the courts are
trying to include in the comparative negligence formula both
the conduct of a defendant(s) which is causal of the accident
and the injuries, and the conduct of a defendant which is
merely causal of the injuries. The solution to the problem
would be to follow the procedure outlined in Foley v. City of
West Allis, 76 White v. Lunder,7 7 and Johnson v. Ray.78 The
trier of fact should distinguish between conduct which is
causal of both the accident and the injuries and conduct which
is causal only of the injuries. The following procedure is
suggested:
1. The trier of fact is to determine whether or not the in-
jured party has a cause of action against the defendant who
caused the accident. In Sumnicht that would have been the
host driver (Conner) and in Maskrey the driver of the second
car (Szuta). The jury would be asked to compare the causal
and contributory negligence, other than seat belt negligence,
of the plaintiff with that of the defendant who caused the
accident. If the plaintiff has a cause of action against the
defendant because the plaintiff's negligence is not greater
than the defendant's, then the trier of fact should be required
to determine the total damages suffered by the plaintiff
(property and personal injury) as a result of the collision.
76. 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983).
77. 66 Wis. 2d 563, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975).
78. 99 Wis. 2d 777, 299 N.W.2d 849 (1981).
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2. The trier of fact would then be asked to determine if the
manufacturer's defective design was a substantial factor in
causing injury to the plaintiff. That is, did the second colli-
sion enhance the plaintiff's injuries? Once the trier of fact
has determined that the manufacturer of the product was
negligent and/or strictly liable for a defective design and
that this negligence or defective design was a substantial fac-
tor in enhancing the plaintiff's injuries, then the trier of fact
would be asked to determine what percentage of the total
harm was to be allocated to the plaintiff, to the defendant
who caused the accident, and to the manufacturer who en-
hanced the injuries. The jury would be required to make a
percentage finding in every instance where the conduct of
the defendant manufacturer was a substantial factor in caus-
ing the injuries. This means that the defendant who caused
the accident would be liable severally for all of the injuries,
less any percentage allocable to the plaintiff. As to the inju-
ries that were enhanced, the defendant who caused the acci-
dent and the manufacturer would be jointly and severally
liable for that percentage.
3. If the injured plaintiff was also guilty of seat belt negli-
gence, then the trier of fact would be required to follow the
Foley79 formula.
As between the defendant who caused the accident and the
manufacturer who enhanced the injuries, there would be no
right of contribution or apportionment between them as to the
injuries caused solely by the initial collision, but as to the en-
hanced injuries, the Bielski80 formula of comparative contri-
bution would then come into operation.
79. Foley, 113 Wis. 2d at 485-86, 335 N.W.2d at 831.




1722 WIS JI-CIVIL 1722
1722 DAMAGES FROM NONCONCURRENT OR
SUCCESSIVE TORTS
Subdivision - of Question - asks what sum will
fairly and reasonably compensate (Plaintifl) for any damages
he incurred in the accident involving (Plaintiff) and
(Defendant).
Where a person has received injuries from separate acts
which are not related to each other, the total damages sus-
tained by the injured person must be divided among the sepa-
rate acts which caused such damages.
You should not be concerned that you cannot divide the
damages exactly or with mathematical precision. In answer-
ing this question (these questions), you should use your best
judgment, based on the evidence received during the trial, to
determine the damages incurred by (Plainti) in the accident
involving (Defendant).
COMMENT
This instruction was originally approved by the Commit-
tee in 1963. The instruction and comment were revised in
1983.
See Comment to Wis JI-Civil 1722A. 184, Regents Univ.
of Wis.
* Copyright, 1980 by the Regents, University of Wisconsin. Reprinted with the




1722A WIS JI-CIVIL 1722A
DAMAGES FROM NONCONCURRENT OR
SUCCESSIVE TORTS
(To Be Used Where Several Tortfeasors are Parties)
Evidence has been received during the trial that (the plain-
tiff) may have received injuries from separate accidents.
Subdivision - of question - asks what percentage of
any damages incurred by (plaintiff) was attributable to the ac-
cident involving (plaintiff) and (defendant A). Subdivision -
- of question - asks the same question as to what percent-
age of any damages incurred by (plaintiff) was attributable to
the accident involving (plaintiff) and (defendant B).
Where a person has received injuries from separate acts
which are not related to each other, the total damages sus-
tained by the injured person must be divided among the sepa-
rate acts which caused such damages.
You should not be concerned that you cannot divide the
damages exactly or with mathematical precision. In answer-
ing these questions, you should use your best judgment, based
on the evidence received during the trial, to apportion the per-
centages of any damage sustained by (plaintiff) to the separate
accidents. 1984, Univ. of Wis.
* Copyright, 1980 by the Regents, University of Wisconsin. Reprinted with the
permission of the University of Wisconsin.
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1722A WIS JI-CIVIL 1722A
COMMENT
This instruction and comment were approved in 1983.
WIS JI-CIVIL 1722 and 1722A are to be used where the
plaintiff has suffered injuries from nonconcurrent torts, also
referred to as successive torts. This instruction (1722A) is to
be used where more than one tortfeasor is in the lawsuit as a
party.
The Committee recognizes the difficulties, in some cases,
in apportioning damages between or among nonconcurrent
tortfeasors. This instruction requires the jury to divide the
damages even though such a division may be difficult because
of the nature of the plaintiff's injuries.
Formerly, Wisconsin Jury Instructions - Civil contained a
series of three instructions which dealt with the issue of appor-
tioning damages from nonconcurrent torts. These instruc-
tions were: (1) WIS JI-CIVIL 1721, Damages: Indivisible
Injuries from Nonconcurrent or Successive Torts: Expert Tes-
timony; (2) WIS JI-CIVIL 1722, Damages: Divisible Injuries
From Nonconcurrent or Successive Torts; and (3) WIS JI-
CIVIL 1723, Damages: Conflict As To Whether Injuries Are
Divisible or Indivisible. These instructions were revised by
the Committee in 1978 to decisions in Johnson v. Heintz, 61
Wis. 2d 585, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973), and after retrial in John-
son v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976). Ac-
cording to its comment, WIS JI-CIVIL 1721 was to be used
where the court determined as a matter of law that the defend-
ants were not joint tortfeasors, and that the accidents were
successive, and that there was uncontroverted expert testi-
mony that the plaintiff's injuries were not divisible. WI JI-
CIVIL 1722 was to be used where the trial judge determined
that the damages were divisible. WIS JI-CIVIL 1723 was to
be used where there was a conflict in the trial testimony on
whether the injuries were divisible.
In earlier case law, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had sug-
gested that nonconcurrent tortfeasors were jointly liable for
all injuries to the victim where it was impossible to divide the
harm caused by each defendant. Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d
465, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958); Bolick v. Gallagher, 268 Wis. 421,
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67 N.W.2d 860 (1955). Those two cases stood for the general
proposition that because allocating responsibility for indivisi-
ble injuries would place an impossible burden on juries, con-
tribution was appropriate for the actual injury, even though
the injury was the result of successive (not joint) tortious acts.
This suggestion in Heims and Bolick that joint liability could
arise from the indivisibility of injuries was expressly rejected
by the court in Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hosp., 51 Wis. 2d
281, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971). Justice Hallows, who authored
that opinion, stated that juries should have no more difficulty
in allocating damages to the respective negligence of two
tortfeasors than they do in allocating contribution of negli-
gence of two tortfeasors to the injury and damages.
In the first Johnson v. Heintz decision, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the holding in Butzow that inseparability of dam-
ages could not create joint liability of successive tortfeasors.
Johnson No. 1, in rejecting 1721, clearly stated that a
tortfeasor is only responsible for the percentage of the dam-
ages and injury as was caused by his negligence, even though
the injury itself is indivisible. The term "joint liability," as
employed in earlier cases, was used in the generic sense. It is
not a joint and several liability concept as in the typical two-
car accident case where two sources of negligence concur in
time and combine to produce one accident. There, of course,
contribution will lie and the liability is joint and several.
In the second Johnson v. Heintz decision, the court noted
that in Johnson No. 1 it had stated that an "allocation of dam-
ages as to the impact was necessary." Nevertheless, the court,
in dicta, suggested that expert testimony could be used to es-
tablish the indivisibility of the plaintiff's injuries and, conse-
quently, the joint liability of nonconcurrent tortfeasors. This
suggestion was dicta because the jury verdict after the retrial
determined that all damages were occasioned by the first im-
pact and that the defendant Heintz was solely responsible for
all damages in the case.
After reviewing the case law on this issue, the Committee
believes that the jury should apportion all damages received in
nonconcurrent torts. As such, Wis. JI-Civil 1721 and 1723
are withdrawn. Wis. JI-Civil 1722 has been simplified so that
it applies where only one tortfeasor is a party. Wis. JI-Civil
1722A has been added for use in cases where multiple
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tortfeasors are actually in the lawsuit. This instruction re-
quires the jury to apportion the plaintiffs damages between
the nonconcurrent tortfeasors. This conforms to the supreme
court's decision in the first Johnson decision and to Justice
Hallows' statement in Butzow that the concept of the insepara-
bility of damages "is an importation from other states and is
foreign to our jurisprudence, at least since 1931 when our
comparative negligence statute was enacted."
In Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 485-86, 335
N.W.2d 824 (1983), the court stated that "as a general rule,
when there is a logical basis to allocate damages between two
or more incidents and among various parties, courts attempt
to do so." Citing, Prosser, Law of Torts § 65 (4th ed. 1971)
and Restatement (Second) Torts §§ 433A and 465 (1975). Fo-
ley involved the apportionment of damages to "seat-belt negli-
gence" by the plaintiff. The court noted that since failure to
wear seat belts generally causes incremental injuries, damages
should be allocated between the first incident (the actual colli-
sion) and the second incident (the collision within the plain-
tiff's car).
Section 433A of Restatement (Second) Torts, quoted in
Foley, states:
433A. Apportionment of Harm to Causes
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or
more causes where
(a) There are distinct harms or
(b) There is a reasonable basis for determining the con-
tribution of each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned
among two or more causes.
For a further discussion of the indivisibility of injuries
under Wisconsin tort law, see Scott, "The Apportionment of
'Indivisible' Injuries," 61 Marq. L. Rev. 559 (1977).
SPECIAL VERDICT
If you have answered "yes" to both questions - and -
- (i.e., casual negligence of both nonconcurrent tortfeasors),
what percentage of all the damages received by the (plaintiff)
do you attribute to:
SUBDIVISION A - The accident involving (plaintiff) and
and (defendant A)? .%
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SUBDIVISION B - The accident involving (plaintiff) and
(defendant B)? - %
TOTAL 100%
